Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP80R01720R000400050028-9

CIA OPERATIONS CENTER

NEWS SERVICE

Date. 18 Sep
Item No. 10
Ref. No. 8

DISTRIBUTION II

The attached adds to referent item.

ATELLIGENCE 2ND LEAD ADD

WASHN INTELLIGENCE 2ND LEAD A118 2ND ADD: DIFFICULT.''

ABRAMS' CABLE WAS TO THE FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; GEN. EARLE G. WHEELER. A COPY WAS SENT TO FORMER CIA DIRECTOR RICHARD HELMS.

ADAMS SAID REPRESENTATIVES OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AGREED AT A CONFERENCE 20 DAYS LATER; ''WITH THE CIA CAVING IN;'' TO AGREE TO KEEP ENEMY FORCE ESTIMATES AT THE OLD SIZE.

HE SAID THE TET OFFENSIVE WAS PREDICTED BY THREE CIA ANALYSTS ON NOV. 27; 1967; TWO MONTHS BEFORE THE ATTACK. BUT THEY USED THE OLD FIGURES AND THUS SUGGESTED THE ATTACK WOULD BE SMALLER THAN IT WAS; ADAMS SAID.

''FAR BETTER IN OUR VIEW;'' BUNKER'S CABLE SAID; ''IS TO DEAL WITH THE MATTER ORALLY IF IT ARISES . . . FOR STALLING MANY CONFUSING AND UNDESIRABLE QUESTIONS.''

ADAMS; WHO WAS THE CIA'S CHIEF ANALYST OF VIETCONG STRENGTH FOR THE TWO YEARS PRECEDING THE OFFENSIVE; INDICATED THE TWO CATEGORIES DROPPED OUT OF OFFICIAL ESTIMATES WERE AT LEAST 40;000 GUERRILLAS AND 100;000 SELF-DEFENSE MILITIAMEN.

THE BUNKER CABLE WAS SENT TO FORMER WHITE HOUSE AIDE WALT ROSTOW.

ROSTOW WAS TOLD THAT PRESS DISCOVERY OF THE UNDERESTIMATED TROOP STRENGTH COULD LEAD TO STORIES IN WHICH ENEMY STRENGTH WAS ESTINATED AS BEING LARGER THAN IT ACTUALLY WAS.

+WASHN INTELLIGENCE 2ND LEAD A120 3RD ADD: WAS.

BEFORE ADAMS' TESTIMONY BEGAN; COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN OTIS G. PIKE SAID THE MIDDLE EAST WAR IN 1973 CAUGHT THE UNITED STATES BY SURPRISE BECAUSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES DENIED KEY OFFICIALS ACCESS TO INFORMATION THAT COULD HAVE GIVEN ADVANCE WARNING.

PIKE SAID COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTED BY U.S. INTELLIGENCE ''SHOW A REAL RED FLAG THAT SOMETHING WAS ABOUT TO HAPPEN. IT SHOULD HAVE ALERTED US THAT A WAR WAS ABOUT TO BREAK OUT.''

+INSTERD: 3RD GRAF A089

PD1120AED SEPT. 18

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